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We study the role of ﬁscal expenditure during episodes of economic crises using one century data from 20
Latin American countries. We use output drops as way of indicating the irruption of economic crises and we are
abletodocumentepisodesoflargeoutputdropsandlargedurationofeconomiccrises, whicharecharacteristics
that vary considerably among countries. We study the duration of crises by means of count data and hazard
models while we study the intensity of the crisis by means of growth regressions. Our main ﬁndings suggest
that ﬁscal expenditure has low power to shorten economic crises but it might act as an effective instrument to
smooth output-drops during crises.
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11 Introduction
Fiscal expansion is a policy widely used when countries face an economic crisis. In fact, during the 2008 economic
crisis governments of the G-20 countries have implemented ﬁscal policies which should increase ﬁscal deﬁcits
on average by 5.5 percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010. Further, ﬁscal spending represents a large part of
ﬁscal stimulus; accounting three quarters of the ﬁscal plan by 2009 and two-thirds by 2010,see Horton, Kumar,
and Mauro (2009).
The use of these signiﬁcant ﬁscal packages corresponds to the vision that an expansive ﬁscal policy might
shorten or attenuate the negative effects of the economic crisis on economic activity in line with the more tra-
ditional keynesian results concerning ﬁscal policy in the short run. However, in the literature related to ﬁscal
policy and economic expansions there is still debate concerning how big are the ﬁscal multipliers and, the dif-
ferent empirical results ranges from negative impacts to multipliers larger than one - see Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Vegh (2009), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990).
These studies usually relate to evidence obtained from developed economies in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. For instance, Mountford and Uhlig (2008) studies the impact of ﬁscal shocks in economic activity
since 1955 in the US by means of a VAR system while Romer and Romer (2009), using also US data, focuses
in studying the impact of taxation in the US economy by using the narrative approach in the period 1945-2007.
Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) studied the experience of Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s while Perotti (1999)
studied a sample of nineteen OECD countries since 1965 to 1994.
Our paper relates to the above literature but it also differs in important aspects. Firstly, even though our focus
is the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on economic activity, we study that mechanism during economic crises and
we try to obtain evidence concerning wether ﬁscal expansion might shorten the duration of economic crises or
wether ﬁscal expansion might attenuate the drops in output during crises. Secondly, and in contrast to the above
studies, we focus in developing Latin American countries during the period1 1900 to 2000. This is one of the
novelty and strength of the paper as there is still quite small evidence on the topic in developing economies but
also, and maybe more importantly, because in the period under analysis, Latin America presents various periods
of economic crises and ﬁscal expenditure had varied widely during these years. That variation in the data might
allow us to obtain consistent evidence of the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on economic activity during economic
crises.
In our sample we face a considerable number of periods and countries in which economic activity face a
downturn and in which GDP and aggregate demand decrease which contrast to the studies that focus on de-
veloped countries in the second part of the 20th century where economic activity has generally faced periods
of economic expansions and in which economic crises are scarce in number. This is an important distinction in
the methodology as the impact of ﬁscal expansion might be more accentuated during periods in which overall
economic activity and private aggregate demand face a considerable downturn.
1The use of historical data to study economic crises is becoming recently more extended among economic researchers. Barro and Urs´ ua
(2008) studied US historical economic crises in terms of duration and intensity since 1870. Similarly Barro and Urs´ ua (2009) extends the
analysis to stock-market crashes.
2Our approach distinguish between the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on the duration of the economic crisis
and on its intensity. To deal with the duration of the crisis we use count data model while to deal with the
intensity of the crisis, we estimate growth regressions µ a la Barro, in which we allow for different impacts of ﬁscal
expenditure during periods of economic crises. One of the problem we face is the potential endogeneity between
ﬁscal policy and economic crises, as government might react to the irruption of economic crises by expanding
ﬁscal expenditure. To break this possible endogeneity, we use ﬁscal expenditure decisions taken before the crisis
occurs as instrument. We argument that this instrument should correlate with effective ﬁscal expenditure but
should not be correlated with the crisis, as these decisions were taken before the irruption of the crisis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) discusses the way we measure economic
crises and explain how it relates to other studies in the literature. Section (3) describes the data set while section
(4) discusses the methodology to analyze the duration of economic crises. In that section, we propose the use
of count data models, plus hurdle and hazard models to provide empirical evidence on our variable of interest.
Section (5) discusses the results when we analyze the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on the intensity of economic
crises. To do so, we use the methodology of growth regression in which we allow the impact of ﬁscal expenditure
to differ between periods of economic crises vis-µ a-vis economic expansions. Section (6) discusses and provides
estimates when we use instrumental variables to break the potential endogeneity between ﬁscal expenditure and
economic crises. Section (7) provides sensitivity analysis of our results when we use more stringent deﬁnitions
of economic crises. Finally section (8) concludes.
2 Measuring Economic Crises
Recession might be the more vague and broad term used by economists lately. A clear deﬁnition has not yet
been adopted and many economists have come with their own deﬁnition and have proposed different ways of
measuring crises. Among these deﬁnitions of crisis, one of the most commonly used is the one adopted by the
NBER. According to the NBER committee,
“A recession is a signiﬁcant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few
months, visible in industrial production, employment, real income, and wholesale-retail trade2.”
Leamer (2008) provides an algorithm to identify a crisis, imitating the procedure of the NBER committee. He
uses monthly data on payroll enrollment, civilian employment, industrial production and the unemployment
rate to ﬁnd peaks and troughs, reproducing almost all episodes of crisis announced by the NBER.
There are other deﬁnitions broadly used as well. With the advance of computers, researchers have been able
to use advanced computational techniques to identify crisis looking at variables like GDP growth, inﬂation rate,
and unemployment. The aim here is to identify the cyclical and long run components of these variables, to detect
peaks and troughs, and therefore, measure the duration and deepness of the crisis. The most common procedure
to measure this is the use of ﬁlters, such as HP-ﬁlter or band-pass ﬁlter, or moving average techniques.
2See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
3In this line of work, McKay and Reis (2008) follows a double technique strategy: They use a modiﬁed HP-
ﬁlter3 and the Bry and Boschan algorithm. The former is for de-trending the data, since “series (like output) that
trendupwillautomaticallyhavelongerexpansionsandshortercontractions, sinceitrarelydeclines”(McKayand
Reis (2008)), while the latter is used for detecting peaks and troughs, and therefore, the duration of expansion
and contraction. They apply this procedure to US quarterly data from 1948 to 2005 to test whether contractions
on output are briefer and more violent than expansions or not. Their ﬁndings are the followings: i) Contractions
in employment are briefer and more violent than expansions in employment, ii) they do not reject the hypothesis
of equal duration and violence of expansions and contractions in output, and iii) employment coincides with
output at troughs but lags at peaks.
In another line of research, Calder´ on and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) study the impact of trade and ﬁnancial
openness on output volatility using annual data for a sample of 82 countries over the period 1975-2005. They use
two deﬁnitions of crises. As a ﬁrst insight, they use the concept of output drop, which is the distance between real











then, a crisis is determined by an output drop is greater than a certain levelk, which they deﬁne to be 5% and 10%.
Second, they use the concept of crisis volatility, which declares a crisis when the output volatility falls a certain
level4. Overall, they ﬁnd that trade openness might have a stabilizing effect on output the more developed the
ﬁnancial market is, but it might have a desestabilizer effect on output if the higher specialization of production
due to trade more than offsets the low correlation of traded sectors with the rest of the economy. On another
hand, they ﬁnd that ﬁnancial openness may have stabilizing effect when countries have low debt-equity ratios.
Conway (2000) use quarterly data over the period 1974-1992 for 90 developing countries to evaluate the im-
pact of participation on IMF programs on overcoming a crisis. He use three deﬁnitions of a crisis: i) the ratio of
foreign exchange reserves to imports being under a value of .67, ii) the growth rate in foreign exchange reserves
being over a value of 10.2%, and iii) the inﬂation rate being over 4.2%5. He ﬁnds is that participation on IMF
programs increases the probability of leaving a crisis (or alternatively, to shorten it), while a longer participation
in a program makes the next crisis be closer.
While the previous papers focused in a relatively short term analysis, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) gather
data for 66 countries, starting back from the 12th century6. They study frequency and duration of crises to
ﬁnd fundamental regularities, using ﬁve deﬁnitions for it: i) external default, ii) domestic default, iii) banking
crises, iv) currency crashes, and v) inﬂation outbursts. To identify crisis episodes, they use two approaches:
3It is modiﬁed in the sense that it ﬁnds the smoothing parameter ¸ such that the constructed cycle is uncorrelated with the difference
between the current trend and the average of the trend v periods before and v periods hence.
4This level is set to be one standard deviation downward of the world distribution of overall volatility measures.
5These values are chosen to categorize a 34.1% percent of the sample as being in crises. This is done since a 34.1% of the observations
was characterized by being participating in an IMF program.
6Although, their dataset is most complete from 1800.
4one quantitative (inﬂation crisis, currency crashes and debasement) and other based on a chronology of events7
(banking crises, external debt crises, and domestic debt crises).
Similarly to the work of Reinhart and Rogoff (2008),our paper studies crises for 20 Latin American coun-
tries using data over the period 1900-2000 which is obtained from the Oxford Economic Latin American History
Database. Our measure of economic crises follows the idea of Calder´ on and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) as we con-
struct episodes of economic crises by focusing on periods of output-drops. We follow that strategy rather than
following others such as the ones of Conway (2000) or Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) because we have lack of some
of the economic series they use to deﬁne an economic crisis. In the next section, we explain the way we proceed
to measure economic crises.
3 The data
Our main source of data is the Oxford Economic Latin American History Database. That dataset contains in-
formation on twenty Latin American countries concerning demography, labor market, national accounts, inter-
national trade, public ﬁnance and prices. The database has been compiled by merging data from the Comisi´ on
Econ´ omica para Am´ erica Latina (CEPAL), the International Financial Statistics (IMF) and the World Develop-
ment Indicators (Worldbank). The data on Chile has been updated from the Wagner and D´ ıaz (2008) historical
database. The information mainly spans from 1900 to 2000 at a yearly basis.
Figure (1) shows the graphs of selected countries comparing local maximum GDP vis-µ a-vis the effective real
GDP in each year. The difference between these series corresponds to yearly output-drops. Figure (2) shows the
time-series of the average output-drop while ﬁgure (3) provides plots of output-drop per country. As it can be
seen in the ﬁgures, we can identify different sub-periods according to the intensity of output-drops. First, before
1929 some of the countries shows moderate output-drops, and the average output-drop reached a maximum near
7% by the end of the I world war. The second period corresponds to the irruption of the great depression in 1929
and extends approximately until to 1940. In that period, average output-drop almost quadruplicate reaching a
maximum of 20% by the beginning of 1930s and in the case of some countries such as Chile, Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, the increase in output-drop was persistent and took some years to regain the local maximum GDP
before the 1929 crisis. The third period ranges approximately from 1940 to 1979 and corresponds to a period of
more stable growth in which output-drops became smaller than 1% on average by the beginning of the 1950s.
Finally, the fourth period corresponds to the period 1980 to 2000 which starts with the irruption of the 1980s debt
crisis in Latin America. Output drop increased signiﬁcantly in a few years, reaching more than 5% on average by
the beginning of the 1980s and remained quite stable near 5% until mid 1990s.
As it can be seen in the ﬁgures, the great-depression produced large output-drops in many Latin American
countries -such is the case of Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba , El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, M´ exico, Nicaragua,
Per´ u, Uruguay and Venezuela. A similar pattern, but less accentuated, can be observed during the crisis of
the 1980s in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Paraguay, Per´ u,
7Mostly, an archaeological work.
5Uruguay and Venezuela. There are also countries with large and long output-drops in other periods. That is
the case of Bolivia in the 1950s and 1980s, Costa Rica in the 1940s, Cuba during large part of the 20th century,
El Salvador in the 1980s, Haiti in the 1990s, and Nicaragua since the 1980s. These last episodes of large output
drops correspond typically to periods of internal agitation such is the case of El Salvador (internal civil war in the
period 1980-1992); Nicaragua (short but intense civil war in 1979); and Haiti (since 1988 Haiti had a sequence of
5 overturned presidents between 1988 and 1991). The case of Bolivia in the beginning of the 1980s seems to have
a different source: it suffered the consequences of weak macroeconomic policies that caused hyperinﬂation and
a large external debt.
[Insert Figures (1) to (3) about here]
We will use deﬁnitions of economic crisis that depend on the size of the output drop. Following Calder´ on
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008) we set three different thresholds levels k = (0%;5%;10%) concerning the intensity of
output drop required to be deﬁned as an economic crisis. Our ﬁrst deﬁnition relies on k = 0%, which means that
any output drop (output drop larger than 0%) qualiﬁes as an economic crisis. The idea of using this deﬁnition
is that decreases in GDP should also measure decreases on well-being. This measure could have a potential
drawback. Consider the case of a country in a stable growth path in which its growth rate is positive but small
and faces for one year a small drop in GDP. That case might correspond to a transitory shock, in which the
growth rate of GDP is moderately depressed for a short period of time, due to a random but not persistent
disturbance that will not be likely repeated in the near future. If we consider an economic crisis as a major event
in the economic history of a particular country, the short and non persistent disturbance should probably be not
counted as an economic crisis. To deal with the problem we use the threshold levels k = 5% and k = 10%, which
are cases of large output drops.
Figures (4) plots the average duration of economic crisis in Latin America, where duration of an economic
crisis is deﬁned as a sequence of consecutive years in which a country face a positive output drop (k = 0%). The
average duration of economic crises varies widely over time. In the period 1900 to 1929, the average duration is
small, ranging near 0.5 years. The irruption of the great depression increased considerably the average duration
of the crises to almost 2.5 years in the period 1930-1940. By contrast the period 1940 to 1979 shows a consistent
and gradual decrease in the average duration of crisis, being its mean near 0.5 years similar to the period 1900-
1929. Since 1980 to 2000, and in fact in the beginnings of the 1980s, the average duration of economic crises
increased signiﬁcatively and sharply to almost 3 years. That ﬁgure remains with almost no change until the
beginning of the 90s when it decreased to 2 years, still a large number. By the end of 1990s, with the irruption
of the Asian Crisis, the average duration increased to 3 years. Figure (5) plots the duration of economic crises by
countries. Countries with large output-drops tend to be also countries with larger economic crises, such is the
case of El Salvador, Haiti and Nicaragua during their internal conﬂicts. Episodes of macroeconomic instability
such as Argentina by the end of the 80s plus Bolivia and Per´ u during eighties have also longer economic crises.
[Insert Figures (4) and (5) about here]
6Figure (6) compares the average duration of economic crisis when set k = 0% vis-µ a-vis k = 5% and k = 10%.
In the more stringent deﬁnitions the average duration of economic crises becomes smaller as expected; however
in general the series describe a similar pattern. Figure (7) plots average output-drop in Latin America vis-µ a-vis
output-drop in the US, where that series might be a measure of external economic crisis. As it can be seen in the
table, while there are some coincides such as the great depression, there are also important differences such as
the crisis in the US during the second half of the 1940s or the crises in Latin America in the period 1980s to 2000.
[Insert Figures (6) and (7) about here]
Tables (1) and (2) provide summary statistics of the variables, including information by sub-periods. GDP
growth rates vary widely across countries and across periods. The years 1900-1929 and 1941-1979 are periods
of average high growth while 1930-1940 and 1980-2000 have much smaller growth rates probably due to the
negative inﬂuence of the large external economic crises (the great depression, the 1980s debt crisis and the Asian
crisis of the end of the 1990s). Openness, which is deﬁned as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports over
GDP, has varied on averaged between 32% and 42%. In the beginning of the 20th century, it ranged at the 36%
on average and but varied among countries and across years (it standard deviation was 22%). Since 1930 to 1979,
average openness decreased to 32-33%, and it also showed a much smaller standard deviation. In the period
1980-2000, it increased from 33% to 42%. The evolution of terms of trade, ratio between exportable prices and
importable prices, shows a quite favorable position of Latin America in the period 1930-1940 and 1980-2000.
Note that the standard deviation of the terms of trade index is quite large, probably indicating that some of the
countries might haver had unusual prices for their exportable goods such is the case of Petroleum in Venezuela
or Cooper in Chile and Per´ u.
[Insert Tables (1) and (2) about here]
Table(2)also showsthe fraction ofcountries witha ﬁxed exchangerate regime. Inthe dataﬁxed exchange rate
regime corresponds to a situation in which nominal exchange rate has been held ﬁxed between two consecutive
years8. It seems to be two different periods concerning exchange rate regimes. In one hand, during 1940 to 1979
almost 70% of the data corresponded to ﬁxed exchange rates. The situation is quite different in the other periods,
being the case of the periods 1930 to 1940 and 1980 to 2000 the opposites as approximately only 30% of the data
corresponded to ﬁxed exchange rate.
Population growth rates are quite stable on average; however there are episodes of signiﬁcant decreases in
population. These last episodes can be explained by the internal wars that some of our Latin American countries
faced. Finally, the table also shows data on debt (deﬁned as total debt of the country measured as a fraction of
GDP). Total debt remained at small levels until the end of 1970s. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the average
Latin American debt almost triplicate.
Figure (8) plots the evolution of average government expenditure measured as fraction of GDP. Government
expenditure corresponds to all types of central government budgetary expenditure excluding debt redemption.
8This deﬁnition discards situation in which countries had ﬁxed exchange rate for less that two calendar years.
7Government expenditure represented approximately 7% of GDP between 1900 and 1930, when it started to raise
continuously to achieve a 15% of GDP by the beginnings of 1970s when there was a second signiﬁcative impulse
of ﬁscal expenditure that brought the ﬁgures to almost 25% of GDP on average. With the irruption of the 1982
crisis ﬁscal expenditure went back to approximately 22% of GDP.
[Insert Figure (8) about here]
4 The duration of economic crises
We start by analyzing the impact of ﬁscal policy on the duration of economic crises. To do so, we assume that the
length of an economic crisis depends on different fundamentals such as in:
yit = f(git® + x0
it¯ + ´i + °t + ²it) (1)
where yit corresponds to the duration of economic crises (measured in years) in country i at time t while
the variables (git;xit;²it) are determinants of the length of economic crisis. In the above speciﬁcation, f(²) is
a function indicating that yit depends on the above variables. The variable git corresponds to real government
expenditure while xit are other exogenous variables that might affect the duration of economic crises. The term
´i is a country-ﬁxed effect while °t is a time effect and ²it is a well-behaved error term. The country-ﬁxed effect
allows to control for factors speciﬁcs to each country while the time effect controls for common changes that vary
over time.
In our estimates we use the natural logarithm of real government expenditure as a measure of the variable git.
ThevariableisconstructedbydividingnominalgovernmentexpenditurebytheGDPpriceindex. Inaddition, we
include several other variables as control; which corresponds to xit. As variables measuring external inﬂuences
we include the terms of trade, the degree of openness of the economy - measured by the ratio of the sum of export
and imports over GDP- , the exchange rate regime of the economy -measured as an indicator function equals to
one if the nominal exchange rate was ﬁxed and equal to zero otherwise-. In addition we include the population
growth rate to proxy for the growth in the labor force, a measure of macroeconomic instability9 and we include
an interaction between government expenditure and a country’s debt. In that case debt proxy for government’s
debt and the interaction should capture the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy for countries with different debt position.
4.1 Count Data model
Thedurationofaneconomiccrisiscorrespondstothenumberofyearstheeconomiccrisislastswhichisavariable
that consists of non negative integers. The Poisson regression model is usually the common starting point for




E[yitjgit;xit] = exp(git® + x0
it¯ + ´i + °t) (2)
and since the real government expenditure is measured logs, the estimated coefﬁcient corresponds to an
elasticity.
Table (3) provides results in 6 different columns. The initial three columns shows the results when we esti-
mate using the Poisson method. The ﬁrst column includes year dummies and the real government expenditure.
The second column includes in addition variables concerning the degree of openness of the economy plus the ex-
change rate regime plus the variable macroeconomic instability to measure erroneous internal economic policies,
the population growth rate to measure the expansion of the labor force and the agriculture and the manufacture
share of the production to proxy for the internal structure of the economic production. The third column includes
in addition the interaction between government expenditure and debt to allow for a different effect of the ﬁscal
expenditure in more indebted countries. In that case, the number of observations drops to almost half of the
initial sample due to the lack of data concerning debt. Columns 4 to 6 provide similar estimates but using ﬁxed
effect poisson models.
The coefﬁcient of real government expenditure is negative and signiﬁcant in all the cases. The estimated
elasticity implies that an increase of 10% on real government expenditure should decrease the duration of an
economic crisis in between 2.4% and 6.9%. As shown in table (1), the average duration of an economic crisis is 1.2
years in the period 1900-2000 and raises to 2.5 years in the period 1980-2000 which imply that if we assume the
increase of 10% on real expenditure, this variable should shorten the duration of the crisis in between one and
two months in the period10 1980-2000. Note also that an increase in a country’s debt is associated with a smaller
effect of ﬁscal expenditure. The standard deviation of debt in the period 1980-2000 is almost one, which would
indicate that a increase in debt in one standard deviation in that period would depress the elasticity of ﬁscal
expenditure from -0.49 to -0.47 (column 8 of the table). Others results are as follows. According to our estimates,
more open economies face shorter economic crises. The elasticity is approximately -1 when we use ﬁxed effects
in our regressions which indicates that a 10% increase in openness should depress the duration of economic
crisis in about a 11
2 month during the 20th century. Also economies with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime would
have shorter crisis, with the semi-elasticity estimates ranging from zero (non-signiﬁcant) to -0.58, where the point
estimate indicates a crisis more than half shorter compared to countries with other exchange rate regimes. Larger
macroeconomic instability is generally associated with a larger duration of an economic crisis while population
growth decreases the duration of economic crises. We interpret this result as indicating that larger population
growth should be associated with a larger labor force which allows to increase output and shorten the duration
of the crisis.Finally, the structure of the production sector seems to be also an important factor explaining the
10If we focus on the mean crisis duration of the period 1900-2000 the effect is half of these estimates.
9duration of a crisis. In economies with larger agricultural sector, the crisis tends to last larger while in economies
with larger manufacture sector, the crisis tends to be shorter.
[Insert Table (3) about here]
Table (4) provides similar estimates but in the the table we allow for interactions between government ex-
penditure and the exchange rate regime. The idea of allowing for these interactions is that we have obtained
results suggesting that economies with ﬁxed exchange rates face shorter economies crises. A possible explana-
tion for that result is that ﬁscal policy is more effective in open economies with ﬁxed exchange rate regime. In
fact, according to the tradition mundell-ﬂeming model - Fleming (1962), Mundell (1960), Mundell (1962)-, in open
economies with ﬁxed exchange rate regime the impact of the ﬁscal policy is at its maximum. The results on the
table suggest that countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes face a larger impact of ﬁscal expenditure on the
duration of the economic crisis. In the table we include an interaction of ﬁscal expenditure with an indicator
function equal to one if the country has a ﬁxed exchange rate and in addition, we include a second interaction in
which ﬁscal expenditure is multiplied by an indicator function equal to one if the economy has a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime and if the economy belongs to countries with more open economies to international trade11. The
estimates indicates that countries with ﬁxed exchange rate would have a larger elasticity of government expen-
diture,increasing the impact of a 10% increase on government expenditure on the duration of the economic crisis
from -5.8% to -7.2%. This is a signiﬁcant effect but economically is small: if we take the period 1980-2000, when
the average economic crisis duration was 2.5, the difference between both type of countries represents less than
a month. Note that while the effect of the exchange rate regime through the larger elasticity of ﬁscal expenditure
is small, it still remains the direct effect of the exchange rate regime which is still signiﬁcant and negative as
we include ﬁxed effect in the count model and its point estimate remains high (-0.45 in column 6 of the table).
This result suggests that the impact of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime on the duration of economic crisis might
be large and its transmission mechanism seems to occur by channels different than the government expenditure
expansion. The rest of the effects ar similar to the ones on table (3).
[Insert Table (4) about here]
The above estimates tend to suggest various interesting results. In one hand, the impact of ﬁscal expenditure
issigniﬁcantandshortenthedurationofthecrisisbutthemagnitudeoftheeffectisnotlargeinthatdimension. In
another hand, the structure of the economy in relation to the size of its manufacture and agricultural sector might
have an important effect on the duration of the crisis. The point estimates - see table (4)- indicate that an increase
of 5% in the size of the agricultural sector -which means that the agricultural sector should shift for instance from
representing a 10% of the economy to a 15% of the economy- should increase the duration of the crisis in almost
9.6 months (this is a 70% larger) while an increase in similar magnitude in the manufacture sector should shorten
the crisis by almost 4 months (35% shorter). These are quite important effects that state that more industrialized
11We deﬁne economies more open to international trade as economies in the superior third when ranked as function of their openness.
10economies face much shorter economic crises compared to less developed economies with larger agricultural
sector. Other results are related to the internal policies such is the case of the variables macroeconomic instability
which is a proxy for erroneous internal macroeconomic policies. That variable is constructed as a non-linear
function of inﬂation rate and its associated coefﬁcient is around -0.4 and the result can be read as follows: if we
compare two countries that face an economic crisis, one of them with relatively low inﬂation (20% per year) vis-
µ a-vis another with a moderately larger inﬂation (40% per year), the country with the larger inﬂation should face
a crisis almost 5% larger. Finally, the openness and the exchange rate regime of the economy are also important
determinants of the duration of the crisis. We interpret these results as indicating that more open economies
might take faster advantage of external take-off. In fact, according to ﬁgure (7) output-drops in Latin America
are much more frequent than in the US suggesting that one way of escaping crises in Latin America might be by
taking advantage of external demand.
4.2 Hurdle model
The above results were obtained in traditional poisson count data models. We used that type of model as our de-
pendent variable corresponds to non negative integers. Alternatively, we may think that our dependent variable
reﬂects a two-stage process, in which a ﬁrst process determines whether there is an economic crisis and the sec-
ond process determines the duration of the economic crisis given that the economic crisis lasts at least one year.
It seems natural to model the duration of the economic crisis and the impact of government expenditure on the
duration of the crisis by means of a two-stage process. In fact, ﬁscal stimulus might have different impacts dur-
ing periods of expansions compared to periods of recessions since during recessions aggregate private demand
is depressed while during expansions private demand is vigourous. Similar arguments could be given for other
variables in our analysis such as the expansion of labor force (which we proxy by the growth rate of population)
which in periods of recession, and thus of low total factor productivity, should have probably a lower impact in
economic growth.
The two-stage process can be accounted by the hurdle model. In this subsection we follow that strategy and
we provide estimates using the hurdle model which can be written as:
E[yitjgit;xit] = Pr(yit > 0jgit;xit)Eyit>0[yitjgit;xit] (3)
where the hurdle model consists on estimating initially the probability of an economic crisis and latter, con-
ditionally on the existence of the crisis, we estimate the duration by using count data models. In this subsection,
to model the probability of the crisis, we use standard logit models and to model the duration rather than using
poisson models as above, we provide estimates using the negative binomial model as a way of providing some
sensibility in our count data models.
Table (5) shows the results in the logit model. An increase in 10% in government expenditure depress the
probability of a crisis in between 0.3% and 0.7%. Further, as above, a larger the country’s debt the smaller the
11effect of government expenditure on the probability of a recession. Note that in our sample, economic crisis
represent almost 30% of observations, thus the impact of government expenditure is nt large.
Other results are as follows. The larger is the population growth rate, the smaller is the probability of the
economic crisis. That result probably follows since a larger population growth expands the labor force and allows
to alleviate output-drops. Note that according to the estimates on the table a 1% increase in population growth
depresses the probability of a crisis by almost 3% (with the exception of the third column of the table where the
coefﬁcient has half of the magnitude on other columns and it is non signiﬁcant). The variable macroeconomic
instability also plays an important role. If we compare two countries with different levels of inﬂation as proxy of
macroeconomicinstability (20% versus 40% inﬂation per year), the countrywith largermacroeconomicinstability
should face a higher probability of recession of around 10%. The variable openness has a negative impact but
generally non signiﬁcant. In another hand, the agricultural share of production has a positive impact on the
probability of a crisis: a 5% larger agricultural share should increase the probability of a crisis by 3%. These
results are generally in line with the results found in tables (3) and (4), with thee exception of the coefﬁcient
on the exchange rate regime. In this case, a ﬁxed exchange rate regime increase the probability of the crisis in
between 10% and 22%.
Table (6) provides the estimates on the second step concerning the duration of the crisis, conditional on oc-
curring the economic crisis. The impact of government expenditure is negative and signiﬁcant. Even though the
magnitude of the elasticity (-0.4) tend to be closer to zero, compared to tables (3) and (4), the impact is marginally
larger because, while the elasticity is smaller in absolute value, the absolute impact is larger12 implying that 10%
increase in government expenditure produces a decrease in between 2 and 3 months in the duration of the crisis
that has already started. Macroeconomic instability becomes non signiﬁcant and the ﬁxed exchange rate regime
becomes negative and signiﬁcant as in tables (3) and (4).
[Insert Tables (5) and (6) about here]
The results on subsection (4.1) plus the results in this subsection show that ﬁscal expenditure has a small
(moderate) impact in shortening the duration of the economic crisis. The impact of ﬁscal expenditure on the
duration of the crisis might be divided on the impact concerning the probability of occurring a crisis and the
impact on the duration of the crisis when the crisis has already been initiated. The impact on the probability
of the crisis of the ﬁscal expansion is small and thus ﬁscal expansion does not seem an adequate instrument to
prevent the irruption of the crisis. The impact on the duration of the crisis is such that ﬁscal expansion might
shorten the crisis in 2 to 3 months.
4.3 Duration / Hazard model
We have analyzed count model as a way of obtaining empirical regularities concerning the impact of ﬁscal ex-
penditure on the duration of economic crisis. An alternative way of looking to the problem is to rely on duration
12We are estimating conditional on occurring an economic crisis, the average duration of our left-hand side variable increase to 4.15
years between 1900-2000 and to 5.52 years between 1980 and 2000
12models which tend to focus on estimating the hazard function of a crisis. The hazard function in our empirical
exercise corresponds to the probability of ending the crisis at year t, conditional on having been experiment-
ing an economic crisis until period t-1. Our time period corresponds to one year as in preceding subsections.
The analysis in this subsection complements the above estimates. In fact, the analysis is similar to the second
step of the hurdle model, as we use construct probability of ending the economic recession conditional on being
experimenting a crisis. In this case the hazard function to be estimated is:
¸(git;xit) = ¸(git® + x0
it¯ + °t) (4)
where ¸(git;xit) is the hazard rate which depends in the usual time-varying covariates plus time dummies to
capture common time effects. Table (7) shows the results when we estimate the hazard function. Note that the
number of observations drops considerably as we are using only data of countries that are experimenting a crisis.
In the estimates ﬁscal expenditure is positive and thus should increase the probability of ending the recession but
when we include the time varying covariates the coefﬁcient becomes non signiﬁcant. Macroeconomic Instability
seems to be the main determinant in raising the duration of the economic crisis as it decrease the hazard rate.
Overall, the results on government expenditure indicates in the case of the hazard function, and in the case of the
second step of the hurdle model, a low power to fasten the end of the economic crisis.
[Insert Table (7) about here]
5 The intensity of economic crises
We have analyzed the impact of government expenditure on the duration of economic crises. In this section we
focus on the impact of government expenditure on the intensity of the economic crises. By intensity, we mean
how large is the economic contraction. In this case, rather than focusing on wether the ﬁscal policy may shorten
the duration of the crisis, we focus on wether the ﬁscal policy might produce a less accentuated contraction of
GDP.
In our empirical analysis we plan to obtain evidence concerning the impact of government expenditure
growth on GDP growth rate. In addition, we would like to determine wether government expenditure has a
different impact during economic crisis compared to periods of normal economic conditions. To do so we pro-
pose a relation in which GDP growth rate follows a growth regression µ a-la Barro - see Barro (1991) - as in:
Yit = ¯(L)Yit¡L + °(L)Git + µ(L)1(Crisis)Git + ½(L)Xit + ´i + Ãt + ²it (5)
where the indexes (it) indicate country i and time t while (¯(L);°(L);½(L)) correspond to lags’ polynomials
of order L. The variable Yit is the growth rate of GDP, Git is the growth rate of real government expenditure,
131(Crisis) is an indicator function equal to 1 when the country is facing an economic crisis and zero otherwise,
Xit is a set of control variables and (´i;Ãt) are country and time effects respectively. The variable ²it is a well
behaved error term. In equation (5), the coefﬁcient on the variable Git corresponds to the effect of government
expenditure on the growth rate of GDP while the coefﬁcient on the variable 1(Crisis)Git corresponds to the
additional effect of the government expenditure during economic crises.
In our set of control variables Xit, we include variables similar to those included in the growth literature such
as the lagged level of real GDP (lagged in 5 years), the ratio investment to GDP, openness, the growth of terms of
trade, the growth in real exchange rate, population growth, agriculture and manufacture share, macroeconomic
instability and year dummies.
The speciﬁcation in (5) follows the traditional speciﬁcation in the growth literature but allows for a non sym-
metric effect of ﬁscal expenditure on GDP growth during periods of economic crisis vis-µ a-vis periods of economic
expansion. Further, we include lags in the effects of ﬁscal expenditure to allow for dynamic effects in the response
of GDP when ﬁscal expenditure expands.
Table (8) shows the results as we estimate equation (5). We ﬁnd that investment rate has a positive and
signiﬁcant effect on GDP growth. A one percentage point in investment rate tends to increase GDP growth
by 0.4%. Macroeconomic instability and agriculture share have a negative impact in GDP growth. A country
with a larger macroeconomic instability, as above we might compare a country with a 20% yearly inﬂation vis-
µ a-vis a country with 40% inﬂation rate, should face a 1% smaller GDP growth while a country with a 1% larger
agriculture share of total production should face a 0.4% smaller GDP growth, indicating that less industrialized
countries tend to growth at lower rates. Concerning the impact of ﬁscal expenditure we ﬁnd a negative but
small impact during periods of expansions while a positive and signiﬁcant impact during periods of economic
crises. In fact, note that the sum of the coefﬁcients on ﬁscal expenditure growth is around 0.29 in column 2
and around 0.1 in columns 2 and 3. The results on columns 2 and 3 would indicate that a 10% increase in
real government expenditure should impact positively GDP growth in almost 1% (according to columns 2 and
3) which is an important effect if we consider that the average output drop in Latin America is around 9% in
countries experiencing an economic crisis after the 1930 great depression.
[Insert Table (8) about here]
Our results suggest that ﬁscal expenditure tend to have a signiﬁcant but small impact in shorten the duration
of economic crises but tend to have a signiﬁcant positive impact in smoothing the negative cycle in GDP during
the crisis.
One of the problems of the conclusion is the potential simultaneity between the duration and the intensity of
the economic crises and government expenditure. In fact, government might react to the irruption of an economic
crisis by increasing ﬁscal expenditure to expand aggregate demand and increase economic activity. Further, the
more intensive the crisis, the more likely could be the reaction of the government. Next section addresses that
problem.
146 Addressing potential simultaneity
As it was shown in ﬁgure (8), ﬁscal expenditure has expanded considerably during the 20th century in Latin
America, measured as a fraction of GDP. The long run trend in government might be explained by different
factors such as income growth (Ram (1987), Easterly and Rebelo (1993)), income inequality (Meltzer and Richard
(1989)), country size (Alesina and Wacziarg (1998)), pressure groups (Becker (1983)), political rights (Aidt and
Eterovic (2007)) and political institutions (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i Martin (2004), Persson and Tabellini (2000)).
In this paper, as we have argued above, there migh be potential simultaneity between ﬁscal expenditure
and economic crisis. The simultaneity should arise at the business cycle frequency rather than at the long run
frequency as government should react to the irruption of the crisis by increasing ﬁscal expenditure during the
crisis but latter typically governments adjust ﬁscal expenditure to avoid substantial deﬁcits. Some evidence
concerning the potential simultaneity at the business cycle frequency is shown in ﬁgures (9) and (10). In the ﬁgure
we plot the residuals from a regression between the ratio of government expenditure to GDP and a time trend.
These residuals represent the deviations from the long run trend of government expenditure as fraction of GDP.
Figure (9) plots the ﬁscal expenditure residuals vis-µ a-vis output drops and as shown in the ﬁgure there is clearly
a positive association between the variables, suggesting that in periods of large output drops government might
react by increasing ﬁscal expenditure above its trend. Figure (10) tends to conﬁrm that idea. The ﬁgure plots
the deviations of ﬁscal expenditure when average output drops are larger and it shows that ﬁscal expenditure
tends to deviate above its long run trend in episodes of large output drops. Furthermore, deviations might be
quite large, as in the 1982 crisis when ﬁscal expenditure deviated more than 4 percentage points as fraction of
GDP during a period of 4 years. Similarly, during the great depression for a period of nine years Latin American
countries experienced ﬁscal expansions that accounted for more than 1% of GDP in each year.
[Insert Figures (9) to (10) about here]
To break the potential simultaneity between economic crisis and government expenditure, we look for a
variablethatcouldbeusedasinstrument. Theinstrumentshouldbeassociatedwithgovernmentexpenditurebut
not directly related to economic crisis. We propose as instrument a series of expected government expenditure;
GEit ; that contains the data on observed government expenditure in periods that cannot be classiﬁed as periods
of economic crisis while, during periods of economic crises, it contains the level of government expenditure
observed the year before the crisis took place. The idea of using the level of government expenditure observed
before the economic crisis is that it represents the governments expenditure decisions when the economic crisis
was not yet part of the economic environment; and hence does not depend on the irruption of the crisis. It also
corresponds to a time period that is sufﬁciently near to the period of the crisis to be representative of the ﬁscal
decisions during that period. The variable is constructed as follows:
GEit =
(
Git if no crisis
Git¡k if Current Crisis Spans k years
)
(6)
15where Git is government expenditure at time t. Figure (11) provides plots of the (average) expected and the
observed government expenditure, both measured as fraction of GDP. As seen on the ﬁgure, there is a large cor-
relation between both variables; but there is some differences mainly in periods of signiﬁcative economic crises.
The Figure (12) shows the difference between both variables, measured in percentage points. That difference is
positive and quite signiﬁcative during the 1980s economic crises, indicating that government expanded govern-
ment expenditure further more than expected before the irruption of the crisis, which tends to corroborate the
idea that government policy reacts when the economic crisis irrupts. Notably in the second half of the 1980s, the
ﬁgures reversed indicating that countries face a large adjustment in their ﬁscal positions. Overall, both variables
tend to coincide but in the periods of economic crises, when both series might have signiﬁcant differences.
[Insert Figures (11) to (12) about here]
We next discuss our results when we instrument government expenditure. Table (9) present the results of
the ﬁrst step in our instrumental variable approach. The variable expected government expenditure is highly
signiﬁcant and its coefﬁcient is slightly smaller than one. In the table, we include also other exogenous variables
that will be included in the second step of the approach. We found that the coefﬁcient on the level of GDP is
positive and signiﬁcant, even after controlling for expected government expenditure, which gives some evidence
on Wager’s law. Openness is also positive and signiﬁcant, in line with the results in Cameron (1978) and Rodrik
(1998). Tables (10) to (13) shows the results of count data, hurdle model and hazard function when we use
expected government expenditure as instrument. In general, the results obtained above are conﬁrmed. The
estimates of the impact of government expenditure are slightly smaller but remain signiﬁcant in all the cases in
tables (9) to (12). The estimates in table (13) conﬁrm the results indicating low or non signiﬁcant power of the
government expenditure to end the crisis once it has started while it indicates that the probability of ending the
recession decreases with macroeconomic instability.
[Insert Tables (9) to (13) about here]
7 Sensitivity analysis
We have shown that ﬁscal expenditure has low power to shorten the duration of the crisis but has a signiﬁcative
impact in smoothing output drops. These above results correspond to economic crises deﬁned as output-drops.
As we have discussed, alternative and more stringent deﬁnitions of economic crises corresponds to cases in
which we deﬁne economic crises as output-drops larger than 5% or 10%. In this section, we plan to perform a
similar analysis compared to sections (4), (5) and (6) but comparing the effects vis-µ a-vis cases in which we deﬁne
economic crises by setting k = 5% and k = 10%.
Table (14) shows the results of count data models when we use the three different deﬁnitions of crisis.
Columns (1) to (3) of the table use real government expenditure while columns (4) to (6) use the instrumental
variable approach. In both cases, we ﬁnd that the impact of ﬁscal expenditure tends to be larger the more intense
16is the crisis deﬁnition. In fact, when the crisis is deﬁned by setting k = 10%, the elasticity of ﬁscal expenditure
is in between -0.8 and -1.5. Tables (15) and (16) complement the ﬁnding by providing estimates of the hurdle
model, i.e. by estimating the probability of the crisis and later the duration of the crisis. Fiscal expenditure does
not show additional power to avoid the occurrence of the larger crisis, as the coefﬁcients on ﬁscal expenditure
in the logit estimates do not differ across different deﬁnitions of economic crisis. The coefﬁcient do differ when
we estimate the duration of economic crises in the second step of the hurdle model and the elasticity of ﬁscal
expenditure is almost twice larger in the case we set k = 10% vis-µ a-vis the case k = 0%, conﬁrming the ﬁnding
in table (14). These results would imply that while ﬁscal expenditure has quite low impact in decreasing the
likelihood an economic crisis for any of the deﬁnition of economic crises here used, ﬁscal expenditure seems to
have a small impact in decreasing the duration of economic crises and that impact is larger the more intense is
the deﬁnition of economic crisis used.
Table (17) provides a similar analysis concerning the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on the intensity of the crisis.
The table measures the impact of ﬁscal expenditure on GDP growth during episodes of economic crisis. The table
has 6 columns. The ﬁrst two use the deﬁnition of economic crises based on k = 0% while columns 3 and 4 use the
deﬁnition based on k = 5% and columns 5 and use the deﬁnition based on k = 10%. In each of the cases, the ﬁrst
column do not use expected government expenditure as exogenous instrument while the second column does.
If we compare the sum of signiﬁcative coefﬁcients on the polynomial of government expenditure during crisis,
we observe that the ﬁgures tends to be similar in the three cases. A similar result is obtained when we use the
instrument.
[Insert Tables (14) to (17) about here]
These results tend to indicate that ﬁscal expenditure has slightly more power to shorten more intense eco-
nomic crisis while the impact on the intensity of the crisis is similar for the different deﬁnitions of economic crisis
here used. The result seems to indicate that ﬁscal expenditure during intense economic crises allows countries to
smooth their GDP drops such that they are more likely to leave the state of intense economic crisis but the ﬁscal
impulse is not large enough to increase considerably the probability of ending moderate economic crises.
8 Conclusions
Fiscal expenditure is widely used during economic crises. The evidence concerning its impact is still mixed. In
this paper we revise ﬁscal expenditure policy during episodes of economic crises in Latin America.
The paper provides a complementary vision to the evidence currently reported in the economic literature.
There are two main differences with other studies. Firstly, our database consists on a century of data across
twenty different countries. This characteristic of the data allows us to include in our data set larger crisis such as
the great depression or small and mild crisis, such as the one experienced by Latin American countries during
the period 1940 to 1979. Secondly, our empirical design focus in economic crises which differ with the traditional
17analysis of government spending multipliers. We do so because we think that the impact of ﬁscal policy might
differ across different part of the business cycle. Our results tend to ratify that idea.
We found that ﬁscal policy has a small impact on shortening the duration of the economic crisis, as we deﬁne
it. The impact of ﬁscal expenditure is asymmetric on the intensity of crises: during economic expansions is
negative or near to zero while it is positive during economic crises. Further our estimates indicates that a 10%
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30Table 1: Summary Statistics, 1900-2000 and sub-periods
years Mean Min Max Std Obs.
Output drop
1900-2000 0.031 0.00 0.62 0.07 1624
1900-1929 0.024 0.00 0.45 0.06 317
1930-1940 0.091 0.00 0.62 0.12 157
1941-1979 0.014 0.00 0.39 0.05 730
1980-2000 0.045 0.00 0.39 0.08 420
Duration of Economic Crisis, Output drop>0%
1900-2000 1.208 0.00 23.00 2.88 1624
1900-1929 0.546 0.00 7.00 1.25 317
1930-1940 2.573 0.00 12.00 3.22 157
1941-1979 0.519 0.00 13.00 1.62 730
1980-2000 2.395 0.00 23.00 4.37 420
Duration of Economic Crisis, Output drop>5%
1900-2000 0.755 0.00 23.00 2.33 1624
1900-1929 0.315 0.00 7.00 0.96 317
1930-1940 1.981 0.00 12.00 2.96 157
1941-1979 0.310 0.00 13.00 1.32 730
1980-2000 1.402 0.00 23.00 3.55 420
Duration of Economic Crisis, Output drop>10%
1900-2000 0.540 0.00 22.00 2.10 1624
1900-1929 0.192 0.00 6.00 0.74 317
1930-1940 1.503 0.00 12.00 2.71 157
1941-1979 0.175 0.00 12.00 1.08 730
1980-2000 1.076 0.00 22.00 3.31 420
GDP growth rate, %
1900-2000 0.038 -0.47 0.58 0.07 1604
1900-1929 0.042 -0.22 0.57 0.09 303
1930-1940 0.024 -0.47 0.45 0.11 156
1941-1979 0.048 -0.33 0.58 0.06 725
1980-2000 0.024 -0.16 0.18 0.05 420
31Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1900-2000 and sub-periods
years Mean Min Max Std Obs.
Openness
1900-2000 0.36 0.01 2.32 0.18 1348
1900-1929 0.36 0.01 2.32 0.22 169
1930-1940 0.32 0.15 0.61 0.12 98
1941-1979 0.33 0.08 0.82 0.14 661
1980-2000 0.42 0.08 1.12 0.22 420
Terms of trade
1900-2000 1.19 0.15 5.39 0.56 1592
1900-1929 1.11 0.47 2.57 0.40 292
1930-1940 1.43 0.50 4.38 0.61 169
1941-1979 1.05 0.22 3.05 0.34 717
1980-2000 1.37 0.15 5.39 0.81 414
Fixed Exchange Rate
1900-2000 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 1943
1900-1929 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.50 569
1930-1940 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.47 208
1941-1979 0.69 0.00 1.00 0.46 746
1980-2000 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.43 420
Population Growth Rate, %
1900-2000 0.02 -0.07 0.18 0.01 1925
1900-1929 0.02 -0.04 0.06 0.01 551
1930-1940 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.01 209
1941-1979 0.03 -0.07 0.11 0.01 745
1980-2000 0.02 -0.04 0.18 0.02 420
Debt
1900-2000 0.51 0.00 9.89 0.77 677
1900-1929 0.17 0.00 0.45 0.15 10
1930-1940 0.23 0.00 0.50 0.17 8
1941-1979 0.26 0.00 1.03 0.21 243
1980-2000 0.68 0.00 9.89 0.93 416
32Table 3: Duration of economic crises, Count model - Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Poisson Poisson Poisson Panel-Poisson Panel-Poisson Panel-Poisson
ln(G) -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.69*** -0.54*** -0.49***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(G)*Debt 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.01)
Openness -0.23 -2.02*** -0.91*** -1.05***
(0.16) (0.23) (0.25) (0.34)
Fixed exchange rate 0.08 -0.28*** -0.23** -0.58***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Agriculture share 6.88*** 7.14*** 15.74*** 12.07***
(0.41) (0.53) (1.16) (1.60)
Manufacture share 5.60*** 6.04*** -4.45*** -6.28***
(0.91) (1.04) (1.44) (1.98)
Macroeconomic instability 1.65*** 0.53*** 0.42** -0.16
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
Population Growth rate -10.30*** -17.15*** -0.02 -0.03
(2.36) (2.75) (2.95) (3.56)
Observations 1324 1163 647 1324 1163 647
R2 0.295 0.406 0.445
log-l. -2282 -1723 -1082 -1512 -1102 -788.2
Number of Countries 20 20 20
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
33Table 4: Duration of economic crises, Count model - Poisson - Exchange rate regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(G) -0.68*** -0.51*** -0.49*** -0.70*** -0.58*** -0.48***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)




ln(G)*1(Fixed/Open) -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.08**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Openness -0.91*** -1.04*** -0.39 -0.93***
(0.25) (0.34) (0.26) (0.35)
Fixed exchange rate 1.52*** 0.10 -0.04 -0.45***
(0.41) (0.55) (0.11) (0.13)
Agriculture share 14.27*** 11.70*** 14.08*** 11.59***
(1.19) (1.63) (1.21) (1.63)
Manufacture share -4.74*** -6.88*** -7.51*** -7.20***
(1.46) (2.04) (1.54) (2.02)
Macroeconomic instability 0.35** -0.19 0.40** -0.10
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Population Growth rate 0.18 0.14 1.04 -0.25
(2.95) (3.58) (2.91) (3.52)
Observations 1324 1163 647 1324 1163 647
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
log-l. -1508 -1091 -787.3 -1498 -1086 -785.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
34Table 5: Hurdle Model - Logit, Probability of an Economic Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(G) -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.07***





Openness -0.08 -0.06 -0.76***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.20)
Fixed exchange rate 0.09** 0.10** 0.22***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Agriculture share 0.63*** 0.61*** 0.57
(0.19) (0.19) (0.36)
Manufacture share 0.44 0.42 0.29
(0.45) (0.45) (0.78)
Macroeconomic instability 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.99***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.18)
Population Growth rate -2.77** -2.75** -1.34
(1.19) (1.18) (1.85)
Observations 1236 1052 1052 585
R2 0.202 0.277 0.277 0.331
log-l. -589.4 -441.4 -441.3 -251.2
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
35Table 6: Hurdle Model - Negative Binomial, Duration of Economic Crisis>0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(G) -0.22*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.40***





Openness 0.14 -0.37 -1.85***
(0.49) (0.56) (0.65)
Fixed exchange rate -0.32 -0.55* -0.86***
(0.27) (0.30) (0.21)
Agriculture share 4.37*** 5.31*** 6.66***
(1.47) (1.53) (1.35)
Manufacture share 9.46*** 11.03*** 10.63***
(2.04) (2.15) (2.07)
Macroeconomic instability 0.47 0.44 -0.35
(0.34) (0.35) (0.37)
Population Growth rate -6.86 -5.23 -21.81**
(7.50) (7.85) (8.50)
Observations 360 298 298 205
R2 0.136 0.139 0.142 0.186
log-l. -728.9 -617.3 -615.3 -417.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
36Table 7: Hazard Function - Weibull
(1) (2) (3)
ln(G) 0.20*** 0.14 0.15
(0.06) (0.11) (0.12)






Fixed exchange rate -0.88** -0.77*
(0.41) (0.44)
Agriculture share -2.36 -2.78
(1.86) (1.94)
Manufacture share -1.07 -1.14
(3.58) (3.65)
Macroeconomic instability -2.18** -2.17**
(0.89) (0.89)
Population Growth rate -5.07 -4.82
(10.16) (10.35)
Observations 472 387 387
log-l. -77.48 -56.09 -55.61
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37Table 8: Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Intensity of the Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Exog. Exog. Exog. Endog. Endog.
Gov. Exp., Growth 0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1) 0.001 -0.006* -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2) 0.006 -0.003 -0.003* -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3) 0.001 -0.002 -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Gov. Exp., Growth in crises 0.067*** 0.041*** 0.017 0.018
(0.025) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1), Crisis 0.112*** 0.055* 0.026** 0.026**
(0.040) (0.029) (0.012) (0.012)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2), Crisis 0.079** 0.049 0.026*** 0.026**
(0.038) (0.034) (0.010) (0.011)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3), Crisis 0.038** 0.037 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.008) (0.007)
GDP, Lagged -0.129 -1.500*** -0.852*** -0.511*** -0.478***
(0.088) (0.330) (0.234) (0.127) (0.149)
Openness 0.060 0.041 -0.030 0.002 0.001
(0.052) (0.048) (0.062) (0.038) (0.037)
Terms of trade, Growth 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Macroeconomic instability -0.101*** -0.105*** -0.105***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.016)
Investment rate 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
Agriculture share -0.428** -0.425**
(0.179) (0.182)
Manufacture share 0.343 0.345
(0.246) (0.258)
Real exchange rate, Growth -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Population Growth -0.014 -0.015
(0.109) (0.109)
Observations 957 905 838 838 838
Number of countries 19 19 18 18 18
N 957 905 838 838 838
Groups 19 19 18 18 18
Max. Observations 69 69 69 69 69
Min. Observations 24 21 21 21 21
Chi squared 1664 6.328e+08 2.778e+10 1268 9.674e+09
Autocorr. (1) -2.432 1.228 0.383 -2.162 -2.170
Autocorr. (2) 0.172 0.748 -0.799 -1.294 -1.160
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38Table 9: Instrumental variables - First Step
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Gov. Exp. Gov. Exp. Gov. Exp.




Fixed exchange rate 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Agriculture share 0.24 0.42***
(0.16) (0.16)
Manufacture share 0.87*** 0.81***
(0.21) (0.21)
Macroeconomic instability -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Population Growth rate -0.51 -0.39
(0.37) (0.37)
Real GDP, ln 0.12***
(0.02)
Observations 1314 1154 1154
Number of country code 20 20 20
Obsertvations 1314 1154 1154
Countries 20 20 20
Observ. maximum 101 100 100
Observ. minimum 26 18 18
Observ. average 65.70 57.70 57.70
R2 Overall 0.995 0.995 0.995
R2 Within 0.987 0.986 0.987
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.998
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
39Table 10: Duration of economic crises, Count model - FE-Poisson - Instrumented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Real Gov. Exp., Instrumented, ln -0.49*** -0.17* -0.11 -0.22** -0.29***







Openness -0.99*** -1.05*** -0.49* -1.17***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.34)
Fixed exchange rate -0.37*** 1.39*** -0.19* -0.62***
(0.11) (0.44) (0.11) (0.13)
Agriculture share 14.77*** 13.28*** 13.21*** 12.91***
(1.22) (1.27) (1.27) (1.61)
Manufacture share -7.62*** -7.74*** -10.25*** -7.71***
(1.54) (1.58) (1.61) (1.98)
Macroeconomic instability 0.56*** 0.48*** 0.58*** -0.01
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19)
Population Growth rate -2.18 -2.39 -1.39 0.29
(3.09) (3.11) (3.05) (3.54)
Observations 1154 1154 1154 1154 645
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20
log-l. -1222 -1069 -1060 -1057 -800.4
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
40Table 11: Hurdle Model - Logit, Probability of an Economic Crisis - Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES All All All All
ln(G), Instrumented 0.02 -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.06***





Openness -0.06 -0.03 -0.71***
(0.09) (0.11) (0.19)
Fixed exchange rate 0.08** 0.09** 0.23***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Agriculture share 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.65*
(0.19) (0.19) (0.36)
Manufacture share 0.40 0.38 0.09
(0.45) (0.45) (0.78)
Macroeconomic instability 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.98***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18)
Population Growth rate -2.85** -2.85** -1.28
(1.21) (1.20) (1.84)
Observations 1026 1026 1026 583
R2 0.358 0.267 0.267 0.325
log-l. -381.0 -435.1 -435.0 -252.1
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
41Table 12: Hurdle Model - Negative Binomial, Duration of Economic Crisis>0, Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(G), Inst. -0.33*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.76***





Openness -0.31 -0.68 -4.03***
(0.39) (0.46) (1.25)
Fixed exchange rate -0.53*** -0.68*** -1.51***
(0.20) (0.23) (0.40)
Agriculture share 4.88*** 5.56*** 12.23***
(1.15) (1.21) (2.73)
Manufacture share 8.31*** 9.28*** 17.04***
(1.67) (1.75) (3.89)
Macroeconomic instability 0.13 0.09 -0.65
(0.27) (0.27) (0.72)
Population Growth rate -13.15** -11.97* -47.10***
(6.55) (6.53) (16.37)
Observations 289 289 289 203
R2 0.126 0.150 0.152 0.166
log-l. -606.6 -590.1 -588.6 -425.0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42Table 13: Hazard function, Probability of an ending the economic crisis - Instrument
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Weibull Weibull Weibull
ln(G), Instrumented 0.22*** 0.11 0.13
(0.07) (0.12) (0.13)






Fixed exchange rate -0.82** -0.71
(0.42) (0.45)
Agriculture share -2.75 -3.19
(1.87) (1.96)
Manufacture share -1.41 -1.64
(3.61) (3.70)
Macroeconomic instability -1.96** -1.93**
(0.87) (0.87)
Population Growth rate -3.40 -2.99
(10.03) (10.23)
Observations 378 378 378
log-l. -60.10 -54.99 -54.59
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
43Table 14: Count Models - Different deﬁnitions of crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop
Real Government Expenditure, ln -0.518*** -0.911*** -1.504***
(0.064) (0.131) (0.191)
Real Gov. Exp., Instrumented, ln -0.158* -0.066 -0.794**
(0.089) (0.185) (0.310)
Openness -0.886*** -0.743** -1.731*** -0.957*** -0.810** -0.896*
(0.245) (0.344) (0.483) (0.245) (0.339) (0.509)
Fixed exchange rate -0.224** -0.012 0.038 -0.349*** -0.148 -0.183
(0.104) (0.161) (0.231) (0.107) (0.164) (0.226)
Agriculture share 14.952*** 16.916*** 13.591*** 13.904*** 15.068*** 6.752***
(1.154) (1.595) (2.174) (1.218) (1.686) (2.460)
Manufacture share -4.377*** -1.188 -8.043** -7.287*** -8.927*** -23.326***
(1.421) (2.263) (3.559) (1.522) (2.276) (3.663)
Macroeconomic instability 0.435*** 0.517** 0.321 0.569*** 0.581** 0.166
(0.165) (0.229) (0.319) (0.165) (0.229) (0.320)
Population Growth rate -0.713 -2.182 -11.348* -2.993 -4.812 -14.861***
(2.928) (4.554) (5.840) (3.068) (4.766) (5.602)
Observations 1163 1163 1163 1154 1154 1154
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20
log-l. -1224 -774.3 -460.7 -1189 -754.7 -431.9
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
44Table 15: Logit - Probability of Crisis - Different deﬁnitions of crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop
Real Government Expenditure, ln -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Real Gov. Exp., Instrumented, ln -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Openness -0.08 0.04 0.09* -0.06 0.05 0.10*
(0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
Fixed exchange rate 0.09** 0.05 0.04 0.09** 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Agriculture share 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.77*** 0.79***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.15) (0.13)
Manufacture share 0.37 0.76*** 0.40 0.29 0.72**
(0.35) (0.29) (0.45) (0.36) (0.30)
Macroeconomic instability 0.44*** 0.25*** 0.70*** 0.45*** 0.26***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.05)
Population Growth rate -2.77** -1.73** -1.50* -2.88** -2.00** -1.85**
(1.19) (0.87) (0.77) (1.21) (0.90) (0.80)
Observations 1052 880 679 1026 855 660
R2 0.277 0.283 0.253 0.267 0.277 0.250
log-l. -441.4 -305.5 -203.9 -435.1 -300.1 -199.8
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
45Table 16: Negative Binomial - Different deﬁnitions of crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop Positive drop 5% drop 10% drop
Real Government Expenditure, ln -0.22*** -0.15** -0.23***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08)
Real Gov. Exp., Instrumented, ln -0.24*** -0.21*** -0.37***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09)
Openness 0.05 0.80*** 0.80*** -0.21 0.67** 0.47
(0.29) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
Fixed exchange rate -0.31** -0.11 0.21 -0.37*** -0.19 0.00
(0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21)
Agriculture share 2.76*** 4.42*** 4.58*** 3.38*** 3.91*** 3.59***
(0.81) (0.93) (1.09) (0.81) (0.94) (1.20)
Manufacture share 5.26*** 9.45*** 10.29*** 5.75*** 9.38*** 10.81***
(1.46) (1.64) (1.71) (1.37) (1.53) (1.66)
Macroeconomic instability 0.11 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.04
(0.25) (0.26) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25) (0.30)
Population Growth rate -5.63 0.90 -1.61 -9.15* -4.07 -4.88
(4.88) (5.27) (4.38) (4.78) (5.38) (4.88)
Observations 298 169 96 289 165 94
R2 0.133 0.169 0.250 0.150 0.177 0.277
log-l. -621.8 -342.9 -194.3 -590.0 -329.9 -182.4
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
46Table 17: Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Intensity of the Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Pos. drop Pos. drop 5% drop 5% drop 10% drop 10% drop
Gov. Exp., Growth rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1) -0.006* -0.009*** -0.005* -0.007*** -0.004 -0.006**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2) -0.003 -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3) -0.002 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.004** -0.001 -0.004*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Crisis 0.041*** 0.018
(0.016) (0.014)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1), Crisis 0.055* 0.028**
(0.029) (0.013)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2), Crisis 0.049 0.029**
(0.034) (0.012)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3), Crisis 0.037 0.029***
(0.026) (0.009)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Crisis, 5% drop 0.065** 0.027
(0.028) (0.018)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1), Crisis, 5% drop 0.083** 0.030*
(0.040) (0.018)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2), Crisis, 5% drop 0.065 0.030**
(0.044) (0.014)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3), Crisis, 5% drop 0.046 0.031**
(0.036) (0.014)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Crisis, 10% drop 0.057* 0.030
(0.029) (0.021)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (1), Crisis, 10% drop 0.067* 0.017
(0.040) (0.024)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (2), Crisis, 10% drop 0.054 0.030
(0.044) (0.024)
Gov. Exp., Growth, Lag (3), Crisis, 10% drop 0.040 0.029**
(0.035) (0.012)
GDP, Lagged -0.852*** -0.347** -0.965*** -0.374* -0.957*** -0.370*
(0.234) (0.154) (0.272) (0.215) (0.254) (0.204)
Macroeconomic instability -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.097*** -0.122*** -0.106*** -0.119***
(0.031) (0.015) (0.032) (0.016) (0.033) (0.019)
Investment rate 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Agriculture share -0.255 -0.369* -0.242 -0.361* -0.241 -0.367
(0.309) (0.192) (0.314) (0.205) (0.335) (0.232)
Manufacture share 0.280 0.326 0.296 0.293 0.298 0.243
(0.283) (0.235) (0.293) (0.226) (0.293) (0.202)
Observations 838 838 838 838 838 838
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Max. Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69
Min. Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21
Chi squared 2.778e+10 875.8 2.969e+08 146.1 2.134e+08 213.2
Autocorr. (1) 0.383 -2.147 0.543 -2.307 0.481 -2.092
Autocorr. (2) -0.799 -0.965 -0.770 -0.701 -0.732 -1.025
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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